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Abstract
To achieve the ambitions of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the decarboniza-
tion of energy-intensive industrial sectors is becoming increasingly important. This
paper focuses on the economics of carbon cost pass-through: the change in product
prices induced by carbon pricing. We provide a theoretical framework to understand
pass-through at the sectoral level and a constructive review of the empirical evidence
from the EU ETS and other jurisdictions. Our analysis is structured around three
key drivers: international trade, market structure, and free allowance allocation.
We provide a synthesis of our key ndings for policymakers and identify gaps in the
literature for future research.
Keywords: Carbon pricing, cost pass-through, free allocation, full carbon price
internalization, international trade, market structure
JEL codes: L11 (pricing and production), L70 (primary industry), Q54 (climate
economics), Q58 (environmental policy)
1 Introduction
The European Unions Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has now been in operation
for almost 15 years since its pioneering launch in January 2005. Since then, jurisdictions
around the world have introduced carbon pricing to help combat climate change. As
of mid-2019, 57 such policies account for 20% of global CO2 emissions (World Bank,
2019). This number looks set to grow notably as developing countries follow up on their
commitments to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
We are grateful to the European Commission (DG Clima) and Mistra Carbon Exit for nancial
support. We also thank Puja Singhal for help with the empirical evidence, and Fabian Knödler-Thoma
and Jörn Richstein for useful comments and discussions. All views expressed and any errors are ours.
Neuho¤: DIW Berlin, kneuhoff@diw.de; Ritz: Energy Policy Research Group (EPRG), Judge Business
School, Cambridge University, r.ritz@jbs.cam.ac.uk
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Pigou (1920) already pointed to the social value of using prices to internalize environ-
mental externalities and thus achieve socially e¢ cient outcomes. A carbon price implies
that each regulated rms marginal cost of production rises according to the emissions in-
tensity of its production technology. This puts upward pressure on product market prices
and corresponding downward pressure on demand and consumption. It also creates an
incentive for rms to switch to cleaner inputs and adopt low-carbon technologies. We
refer to this e¢ cient policy outcome as Pigouvian full carbon price internalization.
This theoretical benchmark is based on a set of (implicit) assumptions. First, the
carbon price is set at the social cost of carbon or at a target-consistent level that
reects global climate damages from additional emissions. Second, the carbon price ap-
plies to all rms that compete in the same product market. Third, each rm faces the
full carbon price on its emissions, with no watering down e.g. by way of freely allocated
allowances or compensation for CO2-price-induced increases in electricity prices. Fourth,
each emitter e¢ ciently incorporates the carbon price into its internal decision-making on
production and investment. Fifth, product markets are perfectly competitive with the
market clearing price set by the marginal producers production cost plus carbon cost.
Real-world climate policy currently falls short of this Pigouvian benchmark. Carbon
prices, where they exist, are mostly well below estimates of social cost. Moreover, where
rms in one jurisdiction are subject to a carbon price, their rivals in other jurisdictions may
not be. Our analysis focuses on industries producing basic materials such as steel, cement,
and aluminium which account for around 25% of global carbon emissions (IEA, 2017).
In Europe, these industries are covered by the EU ETS but compete with imports into
the EU from less regulated regions. As a result, such emissions-intensive trade-exposed
(EITE) sectors face the risk of carbon leakage and are often granted a free allowance
allocation in an attempt to compensate for an uneven competitive playing eld.
From an empirical perspective, however, it is challenging to quantify the extent of this
policy gap. While the level of carbon prices is readily observed, other metrics like the
degree to which competing rms are covered by carbon pricing, how well they incorporate
carbon into their internal decision-making, and the extent to which product markets are
competitive are much more di¢ cult to precisely ascertain.
The degree of carbon cost pass-through by regulated rms o¤ers a proxy to understand
how policy departs from full carbon price internalization. The pass-through rate captures
by how much the product market price rises if carbon pricing raises the marginal cost
of production in a sector by $1. An important observation is that pass-through, as a
market-driven measure, will reect the impacts of many less-observable policy features.
For example, if a subset of rms is not covered by carbon pricing, then this will be reected
in market prices and hence in the degree of pass-through. Similarly, pass-through will
reect if carbon prices are not e¢ ciently internalized by rms or if the product market
is not perfect competitive. Under full carbon price internalization, pass-through rates
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should typically be close to 100%.
In this paper, our objective is to help policymakers nd a shared understanding of
the economics of carbon cost pass-through. With 15 years of real-world experience with
carbon pricing, now seems a good time to take stock of what has been learned. Section
2 provides a synthesis of the policy implications of carbon cost pass-through. Section 3
presents a simple theoretical framework to understand the drivers of carbon pass-through
for an individual industry. Section 4 provides a constructuve overview of the empirical
evidence from the EU ETS and other jurisdictions. Section 5 concludes and identies
gaps in the literature for future research.
2 Policy synthesis
We here provide a synthesis aimed at policymakers based around answers to a set of
questions. These combine insights from our theoretical framework with our review of
empirical evidence on carbon cost pass-through. We also make suggestions for future
policy and research.
What is Pigouvian full carbon price internalization? Following Pigou (1920), full
carbon price internalizationdenes a policy design in which a carbon price fully inter-
nalizes the climate externality and thereby achieves a socially e¢ cient outcome. This
involves all decision-makers polluting industry and consumers buying intermediate and
nal products facing the e¢ cient carbon price. It also hinges on a number of other
factors, notably: the carbon price is set at the social cost of carbon (or at the level of the
corresponding emissions target); all competing rms face the same carbon price with no
exemptions or watering down by way of free allowance allocation; and product markets
are perfectly competitive. Full carbon price internalization raises the marginal cost of
production, puts upward pressure on product prices, and thereby creates e¢ cient CO2
mitigation incentives along the value chain.
What is carbon cost pass-through and why does it matter? Following in the footsteps of
Pigou, policymakers are increasingly using carbon prices to help combat climate change.
However, carbon prices around the world currently di¤er widely in their levels and scope.
Carbon cost pass-through o¤ers a useful way to think about the state of policy at the
level of an individual industrial sector. The pass-through rate captures by how much the
market price of a product rises if carbon pricing raises the marginal cost of production in a
sector by $1. A shared understanding of pass-through is relevant for at least two important
aspects of policy design. First, pass-through measures the degree to which a carbon price
signal is being transmitted along the value chain. This is becoming increasingly critical to
decarbonization strategies centred around e¢ cient use of energy and materials to achieve
Paris climate objectives. Second, pass-through links to the policy discussion around the
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risk of carbon leakage and the free allowance allocations used to compensate for an uneven
international competitive playing eld.
How does international trade a¤ect carbon cost pass-through? A robust result from eco-
nomic theory is that carbon cost pass-through is reduced by the presence of less regulated
competitors that are not covered by the carbon price. Empirical evidence conrms this
economic intuition. In such cases, international trade means that the scope of the prod-
uct market is wider than the scope of carbon policy. Empirical estimates of carbon cost
pass-through vary widely across countries, time and industrial sectors (including cement,
chemicals, glass, oil rening, steel). This heterogeneity may partly reect di¤erences in
market structure, free allocation, and other market characteristics (such as demand and
cost conditions, product di¤erentiation, switching costs, and so on). In addition, however,
existing pass-through estimates often come with substantial uncertainty, in form of wide
statistical condence intervals. On balance, the available evidence suggests that, in most
cases, carbon cost pass-through for industry is likely to be low probably less than
50%. This suggests that current policy likely falls well short of the Pigouvian benchmark
of full carbon price internalization.
How does market structure a¤ect carbon cost pass-through? Economic theory suggests
that, all else equal, a more concentrated market with fewer competing rms will typically
lead to a lower rate of carbon cost pass-through. Producers with market power then
have an incentive to absorb part of a cost shock so as to maintain higher output and the
associated prots. However, this result can be sensitive to the ner details of demand
and cost conditions in a market. For example, if pass-through exceeds 100% then greater
competition may reduce pass-through (by pushing it down towards 100%). International
empirical evidence conrms that, in general, the impact of market structure is ambiguous.
Some studies, notably on gasoline markets, nd that competition raises cost pass-through
while others, notably on cement, nd the opposite.
How does free allowance allocation a¤ect carbon cost pass-through? A one-o¤, uncon-
ditional lump-sum allowance allocation does not alter market outcomes including prices,
relative to auctioning permits, and therefore also does not a¤ect carbon cost pass-through.
In practice, allocations are now often partly output-based, in proportion to a benchmark
and current production volumes. Firms therefore expect higher current production to
lead to a greater allocation in future and take this into account in their decision-making.
The implicit output subsidy in e¤ect dampens the carbon price and thus mitigates the
increase in the product price even if the underlying rate of pass-through is unchanged.
Allocation conditional on activity thresholds, like in the EU ETS, has a similar but typi-
cally less strong e¤ect than output-based allocation. Over the longer term, free allowances
can prevent or delay the closure of existing facilities and create incentives for investment
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in new production facilities. In both cases, the induced additional production will reduce
the product price and dampen longer-term carbon cost pass-through.
What are the policy lessons from carbon cost pass-through for full carbon price internaliza-
tion? The trade-o¤ at the heart of allowance allocation is that too much free allocation
may lead to windfall prots while too little may raise the risk of carbon leakage. The
current empirical uncertainty around the degree of carbon cost pass-through in industry
makes it di¢ cult for policymakers to navigate this trade-o¤. To achieve full carbon price
internalization, two other policy options may therefore warrant further consideration.
First, a move to full auctioning would avoid the complexities and potential distortions
underlying free allocations. This could be combined with a border carbon adjustment that
mirrors the domestic carbon price in international trade. Second, a climate charge on con-
sumption can have a similar economic e¤ect. It could be levied per ton of material sold
to nal consumers, using the same benchmarks underlying free allocation of allowances
to production. In theory, both options can reinstate full carbon price internalization.
What research needs result from analysis on carbon cost pass-through? Important research
needs remain on carbon cost pass-through. First, the empirical analysis of pass-through
in industrial sector would benet from the availability of higher-frequency rm-level data
on prices, costs and other metrics. This would help the literature go beyond simple time-
series approaches and sharpen the condence intervals around pass-through estimates.
Second, a practice of ex ante announcements of study design could help resolve concerns
about reporting bias (that might result if ndings that do not align with stakeholder
interests or are not signicantly di¤erent from zero are not published). Third, theory and
empirics could be used together more closely to understand how pass-through estimates
based on historical data inform projections about the future in which market structure
and other factors may di¤er. Fourth, only little is currently known empirically about the
pass-through e¤ects of di¤erent forms of free allocation and about the internalization of
carbon prices into decision-making inside rms (outside the electricity sector). Finally,
as carbon pricing continues to spread around the world, more work is needed beyond the
EU ETS which has to date dominated the literature.
3 Theoretical framework
We begin with a simple model that helps understand the drivers of carbon cost pass-
through. We adopt a partial-equilibrium approach as our interest is in an individual
sector that is part of a wider carbon-pricing system. A key feature of the setup is that the
carbon price covers only a subset of rms in the industry, that is, the scope of regulation
falls short of the scope of competition. For example, a carbon price may be local while
competition in an industry is global or regulation applies to domestic producers while
5
consumers are also served by imports from less regulated foreign suppliers. Our objective
is to use a simple model to clearly bring out the roles of market structure, international
trade and free allocation as drivers of carbon cost pass-through. As we further discuss
in the extensions, the main insights from the model are robust to relaxing many of the
simplifying assumptions.
Our model relates to two main strands of literature. First, industrial-organization
papers including Bulow & Peiderer (1983), Kimmel (1992) and Weyl & Fabinger (2013)
derive theoretical pass-through results with an emphasis on the role of market structures in
the case where a cost shock applies symmetrically to all rms. Our model further develops
results for Cournot competition in which only a subset of rms is exposed to a cost shock.
Second, in the environmental-economics literature, papers including Demailly & Quirion
(2006) derive pass-through expressions with a focus on di¤erent allocation approaches and
carbon leakage. A Cournot-based approach along similar lines to ours has been widely
used in the literature to study emissions-intensive industries such as electricity, cement,
steel and aviation.
3.1 Setup of the model
Consider an emissions-intensive industry with a total of N rms, of which NI  1 in-
side(regulated) rms face the introduction of a carbon price  while NO  1 outside
(unregulated) rms do not (where N  NI +NO).
An inside rm j produces xjI units of output which lead to emissions e
j
I , where
zI = e
j
I=x
j
I is its emissions intensity of output (assumed to be xed and identical across
inside rms). Similarly, an outside rm i produces xiO units of output with emissions
eiO at a common emissions intensity zO = e
i
O=x
i
O. The potential asymmetry of emissions
intensities between inside and outside rms (zI 6= zO) will play an important role. Let
XI 
PNI
j=1 x
j
I and EI 
PNI
j=1 e
j
I denote the aggregate output and emissions of inside
rms, and dene XO and EO analogously for the outside rms. Hence global emissions
are E  EI + EO
Firms produce a homogenous product and face a linear inverse demand curve p(X) =
   X, where X  XI + XO is total industry-wide production,  is a parameter that
reects the level of demand, and  is an inverse measure of the size of market.
We assume that allN rms have the same linear marginal cost of production (excluding
any carbon costs), as given by C 0(xjI) = c+mx
j
I for inside rm j and analogously for the
outside rms. The parameter c reects the level of marginal cost and m its slope. Higher
values of m mean that production gets increasingly costly for higher output. The term
h  m= will be a useful measure of the extent of production constraints in the industry;
it sets the slope of marginal cost m against the slope of demand .
We consider di¤erent types of free allocation of allowances Aj that an inside rm may
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receive in a cap-and-trade system. First, under grandfathering, free allocation AjGF is
based on its historical emissions and is therefore economically equivalent to a lump-sum
transfer. Second, under output-based allocation (OBA), free allocation AjOBA is based on
its current output so that aI = A
j
OBA=x
j
I is its per-unit allocation (again equal across inside
rms) and thus corresponds to an output subsidy. Inside rm js overall marginal cost of
production is therefore c+mxjI +zI under grandfathering and c+mx
j
I +(zI aI) under
OBA. Thus dene kI()  (zI   IaI) as the marginal carbon cost where I 2 [0; 1]
is a parameter that captures the output e¤ect of free allocation, where I = 0 under
grandfathering and I = 1 under OBA. Intermediate allocations with dynamic e¤ects are
nested where I 2 (0; 1); for example, higher output todaymay raise the prospect of
more free allocation tomorrow.
We assume that competition in the industry is à la Cournot, with each rmmaximizing
its own prot by choice of its level of output. The prot of inside rm j is given by
jI = px
j
I   C(xjI)   ejI + Aj, where the rst term is its product-market revenues, the
second is production costs, the third is carbon costs, and the nal term is the value of its
free allocation. Similarly, an outside rm i makes prot iO = px
i
O   C(xiO). A su¢ cient
condition for an interior solution is that  > c + kI . We think of rmsoutput decisions
as being roughly reective of annual production choices.
The basic trade-o¤ for inside rms is between protecting their prot margins or their
market share. The model resolves this trade-o¤ based on the standard logic of equalizing
marginal revenue with marginal cost. In terms of the theory of environmental economics,
this is equivalent to each inside rm equating the carbon price with its marginal abatement
cost (i.e., the forgone prot from a marginal reduction in its emissions).
3.2 The economics of carbon cost pass-through
In the model, carbon pricing is always successful at reducing the emissions of inside rms
EI . Given the assumption of xed emissions intensities, this occurs by way of output
reductions, i.e., lower XI . The ipside of the downward pressure on output is upward
pressure on price.
We dene the rate of carbon cost pass-through  as the change in the equilibrium
market price p() resulting in response to the induced increase in the inside rmscarbon
cost kI(), that is:
  dp()=d
dkI()=d
.
This relative metric is unit-free and easy to interpret. The absolute magnitude of the
change in the market price follows immediately as dp =  [dkI()=d ] d .
It will be useful to dene s  NO=N 2 (0; 1) as the share of unregulated rms in
the total number of rms. This metric captures the degree to which carbon regulation
is incomplete due to international trade. In the special case of a small carbon price,
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this is equivalent to the product market share of unregulated rms. By construction, at
an initial carbon price of zero,  = 0, inside rms and outside rms are symmetric with
identical cost structures. Therefore, they have identical equilibrium market shares. So
the combined market share of outside rms is equal to s = [XO=X]=0.
We thus obtain our rst result:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium rate of carbon cost pass-through is given by:
 =
NI
(NI +NO + 1 + h)
= (1  s) N
(N + 1 + h)
 (N; s; h) 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 1 shows that carbon cost pass-through is always positive but less than
100%. It is driven by three forces: the industrys market structure as captured by the
total number of rms N , the degree of international trade s (and hence incompleteness
of regulation), and production constraints as captured by h  m=.
The comparative statics are intuitive. First, a larger number of rms N corresponds
to greater competition for which the market price more closely tracks marginal cost and
so cost pass-through is closer to 100%. Put the other way, in a less concentrated market
with fewer rms, there is greater market power and incentive to absorb part of the cost
shock.
Second, a larger share of outside rms s means that the cost shock a¤ects a smaller
subset of the industry; this limits the scope of carbon cost pass-through. In the limit, as
the unregulated rms dominate the market, equilibrium pass-through becomes very small
(i.e., ! 0 as s! 1). (A larger s is also associated with a greater rate of carbon leakage
to outside rms.)
Third, pass-through is also lower for an industry that faces greater production con-
straints, that is, a higher value of h. This means that production is less exible to respond
to changes in market conditions which translates into a smaller price change. In the limit,
as the industrys capacity constraint becomes binding, equilibrium pass-through becomes
very small (i.e.,  ! 0 as h ! 1). Another way to think about this is that the carbon
price reduces the output of an inside rm; whenever h > 0, this e¤ect then reduces the
(equilibrium) marginal cost which in turns tends to dampen pass-through relative to the
case with h = 0.
In the special case of complete regulation (s = 0) and no production constraints
(h = 0), pass-through  = N=(N + 1); this is a standard result for the Cournot-Nash
model in which a cost shock is market-wide (see, e.g., Kimmel 1992). If, in addition, there
are many rms in the industry so that it becomes perfectly competitive, then carbon cost
pass-through tends to 100% as expected (i.e., ! 1 as N !1 with s = h = 0).
As a numerical example, suppose that the market structure is characterized by eight
rms in total (N = 8), of which three are regulated (NI = 3) and ve are unregulated,
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serving the market by way of international trade (NO = 5) so that s = 6212%. Suppose
that production constraints exist but are modest (h = 1). Using Proposition 1, carbon
cost pass-through  = 30% showing that, in equilibrium, inside rms bear a greater
fraction of the cost shock than consumers.
It is also worth being clear about what equilibrium pass-through does not depend
on. Proposition 1 reveals that the level of demand , the level of marginal cost c, and
the level of the carbon price  itself have no impact on the pass-through rate (neither
individually nor jointly). Varying these parameters shifts rmsmarginal revenue and/or
marginal cost and thereby a¤ects the rmsrst-order conditions and hence the equilib-
rium market price. The point, however, is that they have no impact on the slope of the
rst-order conditions and this is what drives rmsoptimal adjustment to changes in the
carbon price and hence equilibrium pass-through.
Finally, the rate of pass-through is identical for grandfathering and OBA. These lead
to di¤erent cost shocks but the rate at which a same-sized shock translates into a higher
price is the same. However, there is a wedge in terms of the absolute price increase,
dp =  [dkI()=d ] d . The output subsidy baked into OBA mitigates the cost shock
dkI()=d and so OBA nonetheless mitigates the product price increase.
A Pigouvian perspective. It is useful to consider the theory through the lens of Pigou
(1920), by splitting carbon cost pass-through into three components. First, policy failure:
does the carbon price cover all rms? If it does not, then the environmental external-
ity is not fully priced at its social cost. In our model, this is represented by a positive
share of unregulated rms and international trade s > 0. Second, behavioural failure: do
regulated rms full internalize the carbon price? This is a maintained assumption in our
model and almost all of the economics literature. Underlying it is the idea that rms
(i) base their product-market decisions on marginal analysis, and (ii) understand the con-
cept of opportunity cost: even if they have received free allocation, surrendering these
is still costly. Third, market failure: are the markets in which polluting rms operate
otherwise e¢ cient? Our model allows for imperfect competition in the product market,
as captured by the number of rms N < 1. As we have seen, the intensity of competi-
tion inuences pass-through in addition to demand and cost conditions. The Pigouvian
benchmark assumes that the environmental externality is fully priced (no policy failure),
fully internalized by rms (no behavioural failure), and then priced into a competitive
product market (no market failure). Our pass-through model generalizes this to allow for
the additional channels of market structure and international trade.
3.3 Extensions to the model
The baseline model is deliberately simple so as to clearly bring out key features of carbon
cost pass-through. We next discuss a number of extensions that bring additional richness
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to the analysis. These suggest that the main qualitative insights are reasonably robust to
changes in model specication.
3.3.1 Pre-existing carbon prices
For expositional reasons, the baseline model considers a carbon price  I for regulated
rms being tightened while others rms face a zero carbon price. However, Proposition
1 holds in exactly the same way in with pre-existing carbon prices  I ; O > 0 for inside
and/or outside rms. Such pre-existing regulation changes inside and/or outside rms
cost structures, and thus leads to a change in the equilibrium. However, as is clear from
Proposition 1, pass-through is driven by rmsresponses at the margin to a higher inside
carbon price  I . These are determined by the slopes of marginal revenue and marginal
costs. Pre-existing carbon prices leaves the slopes unchanged and thus does not alter
pass-through.
3.3.2 Asymmetric cost structures
The baseline model assumes that, apart from carbon-related costs, the cost structures of
inside and outside rms are identical with marginal cost C 0(xjI) = c+mx
j
I (and analogously
for outside rms). Again, the expression for carbon cost pass-through from Proposition
1 is signicantly more general. For example, allowing for asymmetric marginal cost com-
ponents cjI and c
i
O would lead to exactly the same result. The reason is again that this
does not a¤ect rmsoptimal responses at the margin.
Two other assumptions are more involved. First, incorporating asymmetries in the
production constraint (di¤erent m) would make the model more di¢ cult to solve but
the basic intuition that these tend to dampen pass-through is likely to be very robust.
Second, incorporating asymmetric carbon cost shocks (di¤erent dkI()=d) would lead
to the additional e¤ect that relatively clean inside rms experience above-average pass-
through.
3.3.3 Emissions abatement
The baseline model assumes that regulated rmsemissions intensity zI is xed. This
feels like a reasonable approximation for many emissions-intensive markets in which the
scope to switch inputs and adopt new production technologies is limited in the short run
(e.g., from year to year). Over time, the link between emissions and output will become
weaker. By revealed preference, a regulated rm that switches to cleaner inputs mitigates
the cost shock it experiences due to carbon pricing. A key point, however, is that for any
given abatement-adjusted cost shock (maintaining the assumption of symmetry among
inside rms), the rate of carbon pass-through will remain exactly as in Proposition 1.
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3.3.4 Firm entry and exit
The baseline model is a short-run description in that rm numbers NI ; NO are xed. More
generally, asymmetric carbon prices can induce exit of regulated rms and perhaps also
new entry both of new low-carbon entrants and new unregulated players. Free allowance
allocations, in turn, can prevent or delay exit of regulated players. The pass-through
e¤ects of any such endogenous changes to market structure are ambiguous in general.
There are two types of e¤ects: (1) entry or exit causes a discrete drop or jump in the
market price; (2) pass-through is a¤ected by then di¤erent rm numbers, NI and/or NO.
3.3.5 Non-linear demand
The baseline model makes the standard assumption that rms face a linear demand curve.
Existing literature such as Bulow & Peiderer (1983) show that pass-through will tend to
be lower (higher) than this benchmark if demand is concave (convex). With su¢ ciently
convex demand, it is possible for pass-through of a common cost shock to all rms to
exceed 100%; in this case, a less concentrated market (lower N) may therefore deliver
weaker pass-through. Nonetheless, our ndings that carbon pass-through is lower for a
greater share of unregulated players (higher s) and greater production constraints (higher
m) are likely to be robust to non-linear demand.
3.3.6 Product di¤erentiation and switching costs
Like much of the existing literature on the industrial economics of carbon pricing, the
baseline model assumes that rms products are homogeneous. This is an appropri-
ate simplifying assumption for many emissions-intensive industries in which any product
di¤erentiation between rms is likely modest. In other cases, the presence of product
di¤erentiation will often tend to mitigate the competitiveness impacts of regulation and
raise the degree of carbon pass-through. Loosely put, a higher degree of product di¤er-
entiation has a similar e¤ect to a reduction in the degree of international trade s the
unregulated rms become less relevant. Similarly, the presence of switching costs, which
lock consumers into their current suppliers and thereby tend to partially isolate them from
unregulated rivals (Klemperer 1995), acts as a form of ex post product di¤erentiation and
will also tend to enhance pass-through.
3.3.7 Forward sales and hedging
The baseline model employes the concept of a static equilibrium in a single period setting.
In this interpretation, the cost shock and the resulting price response occur at the same
time. In practice, additional temporal considerations arise. Products are often sold
forward and input costs are frequently hedged. This may lead to lags in the cost shock
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ltering through as hedges gradually expire and to delays in pass-through as price
are sticky in the short term. Nonetheless, despite possible short-term frictions, these
additional e¤ects do not necessarily alter the equilibrium pass-through.
4 Empirical evidence
This section provides an overview of the empirical evidence on carbon cost pass-through in
the EU ETS and other jurisdictions. We structure the discussion around three drivers of
pass-through suggested by our theoretical framework: international trade, market struc-
ture, and free allowance allocation. Pass-through evidence splits into the power sector,
for which competition is local, and industrial sectors such as steel and cement, for which
there is signicant international trade.
The literature employs a range of approaches to pass-through estimation. Some pa-
pers use time-series analysis on observed EU ETS carbon prices to estimate pass-through.
Other papers rely on non-carbon cost shocks, such as variation in fuel prices, as prox-
ies to estimate carbon cost pass-through. Existing literature focuses primarily on the
measurement of pass-through by comparing cost increases based on emission intensity of
the technology at the margin with product price increases. A smaller number of papers
explores the underlying drivers of pass-through. In this sense, the theory and empirics of
pass-through complement one another.
4.1 The role of international trade
Pass-through, as suggested by Proposition 1, will tend to be reduced if only a subset of
players is covered by a carbon price. This economic intuition is conrmed by Muehlegger
& Sweeney (2017) in an analysis of di¤erent types of cost shocks arising from the fracking
boom in the US oil rening industry. Using rm-level data, they nd pass-through close
to zero of a cost shock specic to a single rm, around 20% for a cost shock in a regional
US market, then rising to around 35% for a US-wide shock and, nally, just below 100%
for a global cost increase. Importantly, the richness of their data translates into narrow
condence intervals for these four sets of pass-estimates. These ndings are broadly in
line with Proposition 1 in which, all else equal, pass-through is reduced by a factor of
(1  s) where s is the fraction of players not exposed to the cost shock.
Figure 1, as suggested by these ndings, distinguishes four cases in terms of the scope
of the product market and the scope of a cost shock. In Case I, an input factor such as
crude oil is available to reneries globally at a similar price so the scope of the product
market and of any cost shocks are both approximately global. In Case II, trading of
a product such as electricity is local (e.g., within the EU) and so competing rms face
similar cost shocks irrespective of whether cost shocks are also local (e.g., as in the case
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Figure 1: Scope of product market vs scope of cost shock
of the EU ETS) or global (e.g., as for coal and natural gas used as fuel inputs). Finally,
in Case III, for many industrial sectors, the scope of the product market is (roughly)
global while cost shocks from carbon pricing are currently local. We next summarize
the empirical evidence for pass-through in the power sector under the EU ETS (Case II)
and then turn to industrial sectors (Case III); thereafter, in our discussion of the role of
market structure, we return to settings in which the cost shock corresponds to the product
market (Case I).
Empirical evidence from the power sector under the EU ETS
The literature on the EU ETS provides signicant empirical support for a high degree
of carbon cost pass-through in liberalized electricity markets (Sijm et al. (2006), Zach-
mann & Hirschhausen (2008), Bushnell et al. (2013)). Jouvet and Solier (2013) conrm
the overall results, but emphasize the high level of uncertainty of individual pass-through
estimates. Hintermann (2016) conrms full pass-through by assessing pass-through rates
for individual hours and the relevant marginal generation technology. Fabra & Reguant
(2014) present an empirical study that no longer relies on market clearing prices, but
uses rm-level data on marginal costs and auction bid prices in the Spanish wholesale
electricity market. Consistent with prior literature, they nd that emissions costs were
almost fully passed on to wholesale prices, with carbon cost pass-through ranging from
80% to 100%.
This near-complete pass-through is explained by special features of competition in
electricity markets. First, the high-frequency nature of electricity pricing means that it
is routine for rms to adjust their bidding behavior on a daily basis and so any costs of
price adjustment are small. Second, a high correlation of cost shocks across rms and the
highly inelastic nature of aggregate demand mean that the strategic incentive for a rm
to adjust its price-cost markup is limited. Third, although EU ETS electricity generators
from 2005 to 2012 received free allowances, it was clear that power production volumes
would not impact the level of future free allocation that was based on installed capacity
in 2008-2012 and zero subsequently. Theory outlined in Section 3 would therefore suggest
that rms price full opportunity carbon cost allowances into their product price. And
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indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that the EU power sector comes close to the ideal
of full carbon price internalization, given the absence of international trade and few other
behavioural and market distortions.
While our focus rests on the pass-through of (carbon) cost shocks on input factors to
product prices, the results are in line with assessments of pass-through rates of carbon
and other taxes levied on fuels to retail prices. Erutku (2019) nds pass-through rates of
carbon taxes on gasoline in Canadian provinces on retail prices at and above 100% in line
with his literature review.
Empirical evidence from industrial sectors under the EU ETS
Due to a shortage of suitable data, quantifying carbon cost pass-through in the EU
industry sector has proved to be more challenging than for power. Pass-through estima-
tion, in general, requires disaggregated data on prices and costs for all rms operating in
a product market. To establish causality, it also requires plausibly exogenous variation
in input costs together with information on how individual rms are exposed to the cost
shock. Several studies have bypassed the lack of micro-level data by using time-series
data to estimate pass-through at the market-level. Di¤erent studies have estimated pass-
through in di¤erent industries and for di¤erent time periods so it is challenging to make
any systematic cross-country or cross-industry comparisons is challenging. The paucity of
replication studies makes it di¢ cult to gauge the reasons underlying the wide heterogene-
ity in pass-through estimates. Moreover, prior to de Bruyn et al. (2015), pass-through
analysis had been feasible due to data limitations only by using input costs other than
the price of EUAs (EU emissions allowances) except for the reneries industry for which
better price data had already been available.
Time-series estimates of carbon cost pass-through for basic materials, vary widely
across sectors, countries, and phases of the EU ETS. Oberndorfer et al. (2010) assess the
ability of UK producers to pass-through country-specic (non-carbon) input cost shocks
to product prices in the glass, chemicals and ceramics sectors. In principle, the pass-
through of country or region-specic cost shocks, e.g., from exchange rates, interest rates
and electricity & gas prices, should be indicative of similar potential for carbon cost pass-
through in situations where production volumes are not the basis of any current or future
free allowance allocation (Zachmann, 2008). Similarly, Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) estimates
pass-through of domestic cost shocks (labour, material, energy) and nds that German
energy-intensive industrials in the paper, chemicals, glass, and cement are able to pass
on certain cost shocks. De Bruyn et al. (2015) analyze the extent to which EU ETS
carbon costs are passed through to product prices for a range of countries and industries.
They estimate signicant levels of carbon cost pass-through in cement, iron & steel, and
rening. Sartor (2017) estimates carbon pass through for steel and cement using data
from 2005-2015, and nds no signicant evidence of pass-through for Germany and the
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Figure 2: Carbon cost pass-through estimates for the EU ETS steel industry
Notes: NE1, SE1, NE2, and SE2 estimates are based on de Bruyn et al. (2015), while EU3
comes from Sartor (2017). The graph depicts 95% condence intervals (DIW calculations). NE
stands for Northern Europe, SE for Southern Europe, and EU for Western EU. 1 represents Flat
Steel Hot Rolled Coil, 2 represents Flat Steel Cold Rolled Coil, 3 represents Western EU Steel
Cold Rolled Coil.
UK as well as a barely signicant 4% pass-through rate for France. For cold rolled coil-
steel over the period 2005-2013, pass-through estimates are statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Laing et al. (2014) nd carbon cost pass-through rates ranging from 50 to
100% in the rening (diesel and gasoline) sector.
Figures 2 and 3 present key pass-through estimates, respectively, for steel and cement
including both point estimates and their associated condence intervals. This illustrates
how pass-through rates appear to di¤er widely even within the same industry. It also
reveals that pass-through estimates often come with substantial uncertainty. In some
cases, the condence levels include zero and 100% pass-through such that little can be
ruled out based on the existing evidence.
Carbon cost pass-through estimates for the EU ETS cement industry
Notes: Estimates are taken from de Bruyn et al. (2015). The graph depicts 95% condence
intervals (DIW calculations). 1 represents total cement, 2 represents Portland Cement, 3 rep-
resents Clinker, Pooled 4 represents Portland Cement estimates for FR, UK, and DE using an
OLS regression from Sartor (2017). UK 1 did not pass a misspecication test.
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Figure 3: Carbon cost pass-through estimates for the EU ETS cement industry
Notes: Estimates are taken from de Bruyn et al. (2015). The graph depicts 95% condence
intervals (DIW calculations). 1 represents total cement, 2 represents Portland Cement, 3 rep-
resents Clinker, Pooled 4 represents Portland Cement estimates for FR, UK, and DE using an
OLS regression from Sartor (2017). UK 1 did not pass a misspecication test.
In sum, the empirical evidence for carbon cost pass-through in industry reveals how
estimates are highly contingent on time and space; pass-through estimates are typically
both small and come with substantial uncertainty. In any case, the available evidence
suggests that EU climate policy for industry still falls substantially short of the Pigouvian
benchmark of full carbon price internalization.
Empirical evidence from an EU ETS event study
Using an event study methodology, Bushnell et al. (2013) estimate the impact of the
sharp drop in the EUA price in April 2006 on the stock market valuations of publicly-
traded EU ETS rms. This sidesteps the problem of data availability on rm-level mar-
ginal costs and product prices. However, to inform the debate on pass-through, it still
requires disentangling the e¤ect of the carbon price on the value of grandfathered al-
lowances held by EU ETS rms at the time.
We now provide an illustrative pass-through calculation for steel based on Bushnell et
al.s (2013) results. For simplicity, we consider a representative (average) EU rm in the
sector and assume that the product market is perfectly competitive. We also assume that
the drop in the carbon price a¤ects prots in the current year but then reverts back to
its expected trajectory. (The rms stock market value V at time t can be thought of its
discounted prot stream, V (t) = (t)+V (t+1); our approach considers only dV = d.)
Our calculation is (very) short-term in that we allow product prices to adjust but assume
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that rmsproduction and emissions are xed.
The rms current prots can be written in terms of the carbon price  as () =
p()x() C(x())  e() + A, where A is its grandfathered free allocation. The prot
impact of a change in the carbon price is therefore given by:
d
d
= e() + [p()  C 0(x())] dx()
d
   de()
d
+ [A  e()],
where dp()=d = e() in which , as before, is the rate of carbon cost pass-through
(as the emissions intensity z  e=x). Given the assumption that production x() and
emissions e() are xed, we obtain a simplied version: dV = d = [(  1)e+ A] d .
Rearranging in terms of carbon cost pass-through yields:
 =

dV=V
[(A  e)d ]=V   1

(A  e)
e
.
This equation allows us to translate the ndings from the event study into implied
pass-through estimates. First, using data on rm-level allocation and emissions, Bushnell
et al. (2013) calculate rm-level surplus allowance allocations with an average surplus
(A  e)=e = 18%. Second, they nd that the change in the value of this allowance surplus
due to changes in the carbon price corresponds, on average, to [(A   e)d ]=V = 1:3%.
Third, using variation in the share of rms sales to the European market, they nd
that for the average steel rm the carbon price drop resulted in a valuation decline of
dV=V = 1:8%. Using these three ndings yields an implied rate of carbon cost pass-
through of  ' 7%. While this estimate should be regarded only as a rst approximation,
it appears in line with other ndings in the literature that pass-through in industrial
sectors is low.
4.2 The role of market structure
Market structure can have a signicant impact on cost pass-through. Proposition 1 sug-
gests that a more concentrated market yields lower pass-through as rms with more
market power have an incentive to absorb more of a cost shock. However, as discussed in
our model extensions, this conclusion can be sensitive to the shape of the demand curve.
Therefore, unlike for international trade, microeconomic theory o¤ers no unambiguous
guidance on the role of market structure. This is conrmed by Gulli and Chernyavska
(2013) based on a review of estimated pass-through rates of carbon prices in European
Power markets and potential theoretical drivers.
A small number of recent empirical papers have obtained evidence on the relation-
ship between pass-through of fuel cost shocks and competition using micro-level data.
These papers focus on settings in which our two other potential drivers of pass-through
international trade and free allocation play no role. In the EU ETS context, the empiri-
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cal evidence is very limited, with Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) nding that higher market power
among industrial rms in relatively homogenous product markets is associated with lower
domestic cost pass-through.
Some papers nd that competition is associated with lower cost pass-through. Gana-
pati et al. (2019) estimate pass-through of energy cost shocks for six homogenous single-
product US manufacturing industries: boxes, bread, cement, concrete, gasoline, and ply-
wood. For industries also represented in the EU ETS, they nd considerable inter-industry
heterogeneity with cost pass-through of 80% for concrete, above 100% for cement, and
36% for gasoline. In terms of market structure, cement is the industry that appears to be
the least competitive but also has the highest pass-through. Miller et al. (2017) obtain a
related result in an analysis of fuel cost shocks in the US Portland cement industry; they
also estimate that cost pass-through exceeds 100% and further nd that a larger number
of rivals is associated with weaker pass-through that declines towards 100% with more
competition. Similarly, Kopczuk et al. (2016) does not nd strong evidence of greater cost
pass-through of gasoline taxes in US states with more concentrated wholesale markets.
Some recent work has estimated rm-level pass-through that accounts for di¤erences in
rmsproduction technologies. Grey & Ritz (2018) use fuel cost shocks to estimate pass-
through in the context of the US airline industry. The central feature of their empirical
analysis is that low-cost carriers such as Southwest tend to y newer, more fuel-e¢ cient
aircraft than the incumbent legacy airlines so fuel cost shocks are asymmetric. Firm-
level pass-through therefore measures how a rms price responds to a $1 increase in
its marginal cost where its rivals may experience cost shocks of varying magnitudes.
They nd that rm-level pass-through for Southwest exceeds 100% while average pass-
through across legacy carriers is signicantly below 100% but only limited evidence for
the importance of market structure.
In sum, as already suggested by microeconomic theory, the empirical evidence on the
role of market structure as a driver of cost pass-through is mixed. Some papers nd
evidence for the traditional result that competition intensies pass-through and others
nd the opposite.
4.3 The role of free allowance allocation
We now to turn to the free allocation of carbon allowances as our nal driver of carbon
cost pass-through. Free allocation has to date played an important role in ETS design, no-
tably in terms of the debate on international competition and risks of carbon leakage. As
an analytical benchmark, if free allowance allocation comprises an unconditional, one-o¤
allocation then it does not alter market outcomes including prices (Coase, 1960; Mont-
gomery, 1972) relative to auctioning permits and therefore also does not a¤ect rates of
carbon cost pass-through. This would be consistent with a grandfathered allocation that
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is not expected to have any bearing on the future.
Empirical evidence on the role of free allowance allocation is very limited. Fabra
& Reguant (2014) address the issue as part of their carbon cost pass-through analysis
for the EU ETS power sector. During their sample period in the mid-2000s, electricity
generators received a large allocation of grandfathered permits that was often close to
su¢ cient to cover their demand for allowances. Their analysis suggests that market
participants indeed did not expect their emissions to impact current or future allowance
allocations, which was in line with the free allowance allocation provisions under EU ETS.
Moreover, market participants were su¢ ciently sophisticated to recognize that the option
to sell freely allocated allowances represents an opportunity cost which they fully priced
into their decision-making. This is consistent with the Coasian benchmark and suggest
that, at least in this case, the role of any behavioural failures on the part of rms was
limited.
Given the paucity of empirical evidence, we now discuss other literature that in-
forms the economic principles underlying allocations and the impacts on carbon cost
pass-through. In the short-term, the design of free allocation may be non-neutral for
two sets of reasons:
(1) Output based allocation (OBA) and other dynamic e¤ects: Free allocation does
a¤ect incentives if a rms current behaviour has an inuence on future allocation or a
current allocation is conditional on current behaviour such as its output (Burtraw et al,
2005; Harrison & Radov, 2002). Under OBA, allocation in the current year or subsequent
years is proportional to current production volume times a benchmark coe¢ cient. Hence
the current marginal cost of production is reduced by the value of implied additional free
allocation. As also shown in our theoretical framework, the output subsidy mitigates the
increase in the product price (Jensen and Rasmussen 2000).
(2) Allocation conditional on activity level thresholds: Since the beginning of EU ETS
Phase 3 in 2012, allocation has been conditional on activity levels such as 50%. While this
is often not a binding constraint, at times of weak demand and low capacity utilization
a rm may have an incentive to keep its output above the trigger level to avoid loss
of free allowances. This can motivate pricing below marginal cost and thus also reduce
pass-through (Branger et al., 2015).
Over the longer term, free allowance allocation can have several other market impacts.
In particular, the prospect of free allowances can prevent or delay the closure of existing
facilities and also create incentives for investment in new production facilities (Neuho¤
et al., 2006). First, free allocation to an existing facility may push its average cost
below the market price and therefore prevent its closure. Second, free allocation to a new
installation irrespective of the precise mode of allocation reduces its overall production
cost. In both cases, the induced additional production will reduce the market price and
dampen longer-term pass-through in this sense.
19
5 Conclusions
The economic theory and empirical evidence on carbon cost pass-through in industry
can be structured into three drivers. First, on international trade, a robust result from
economic theory, conrmed by empirical evidence, is that a larger share of less regulated
competitors weakens pass-through. Empirical estimates of cost pass-through vary widely
by sector, country, and time period; they are also frequently insignicant due to wide
condence intervals and data-related challenges. Second, on market structure, theoretical
guidance is less clear-cut: the traditional view is that competition raises pass-through but
this result can be overturned under particular demand conditions. Indeed, empirical work
has also found evidence for both views. Third, dynamic or conditional free allocation,
such as output-based allocation, tend to water down the carbon cost shock by subsidizing
current production and therefore mitigate the increase in product prices (even if the
underlying pass-through rate remains unchanged). Empirical evidence is scarce except
for power markets in which rms understand the opportunity cost of freepermits.
Important research needs remain on carbon cost pass-through. First, the empirical
analysis of pass-through in industrial sector would benet from the availability of higher-
frequency rm-level data on prices, costs and other metrics. This would help the literature
go beyond simple time-series approaches and sharpen the condence intervals around
pass-through estimates. Second, a practice of ex ante announcements of study design
could help resolve concerns about reporting bias (that might result if ndings that do
not align with stakeholder interests or are not signicantly di¤erent from zero are not
published). Third, theory and empirics could be used together more closely to understand
how pass-through estimates based on historical data inform projections about the future
in which market structure and other factors may di¤er. Fourth, only little is currently
known empirically about the pass-through e¤ects of di¤erent forms of free allocation and
about the internalization of carbon prices into decision-making inside rms (outside the
electricity sector). Finally, as carbon pricing continues to spread around the world, more
work is needed beyond the EU ETS which has to date dominated the literature.
The current empirical uncertainty around the degree of carbon cost pass-through in
industry makes it di¢ cult for policymakers to navigate the trade-o¤ between windfall
prots and carbon leakage. To achieve full carbon price internalization, two other policy
options may therefore warrant further consideration. First, a move to full auctioning
would avoid the complexities and potential distortions underlying free allocations. This
could be combined with a border carbon adjustment that mirrors the domestic carbon
price in international trade. Second, a climate charge on consumption can have a similar
economic e¤ect. It could be levied per ton of material sold to nal consumers, using the
same benchmarks underlying free allocation of allowances to production. In theory, both
options can reinstate full carbon price internalization.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof uses the rst-order conditions for prot-maximization
for all rms to derive the equilibrium market price and hence the rate of pass-through.
The rst-order condition for inside rm j is given by @jI=@x
j
I = p xjI c mxjI kI = 0.
Summing this condition over the NI inside rms gives an aggregate version for XI :
NIp  ( +m)XI  NI(c+ kI) = 0.
Likewise, the rst-order condition for outside rm i is given by @iO=@x
i
O = p   xiO  
c mxiO = 0, and so the corresponding aggregate version for XO is:
NOp  ( +m)XO  NOc = 0
23
Adding these two aggregate versions yields an industry-wide expression for total outputX:
(NI +NO)(  X)  ( +m)X   (NI +NO)c NIkI = 0.
Instead writing this in terms of the market price p =   X gives:
(NI +NO)p 

1 +
m


(  p)  (NI +NO)c NIkI = 0,
and so:
p() =
(1 + h) + (NI +NO)c+NIkI()
(NI +NO + 1 + h)
)  = NI
(NI +NO + 1 + h)
,
where h  m= and from which the result follows straightforwardly as claimed.
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